Thursday Roll-up of Missile News and Notes: Российский Выпуск (Russian Edition)

Another average week…the Iranians started it off by claiming to have launched their SLV, but then, no, wait, it was just a sounding rocket (some think it was nothing more than a Scud B shot straight up which would have yielded the 150 km altitude claimed). Fallout from China’s ASAT test continued in the wake of critical comments delivered from many nations at the Conference on Disarmament held a couple of weeks ago – so much so that China now says they will not conduct any new ASAT tests. And of course, Russia keeps up the steady drumbeat of angst over the US plan to base a portion of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Poland and the Czech Republic. Seizing on the INF as a bat to brow beat Europe, and in particular, those states that constituted Eastern Europe under Soviet domination and occupation, into opposing the deployment with thinly veiled threats of re-opening IRBM/MRBM production lines (particularly of the notorious SS-20/RDS-10 “Pioneer”) and targeting those countries that would host BMDS elements. In his travels to and fro the ‘sphere researching these and other news items, YHS has come across a few gems to share with you today.

We begin with a guest editorial from Mikhail Baranov, science editor, Arms Export magazine as it appears in Kommersant (“Businessman”) which advertises itself as Russia’s Daily Online, under the heading of “Short-sighted Midrange Rockets.” In the article, Baranov takes current Russian leadership to task for recent statements regarding withdrawing from the INF treaty and deploying “a new SS-20.” Clearly he sees this move as anything but in Russia’s best interest:

“Russian politicians and generals are apparently in the thralls of nostalgia for the horror that embraced NATO 30 years ago after Pioneers were placed along the Western borders of the Warsaw Pact countries. The obvious assumption is that the Eastern European countries, frightened by Russian short- and midrange missiles aimed in their direction, will prefer good relations with Moscow to a dangerous and poorly defined alliance with Washington. It is also assumed that a wedge will be driven into relations between Western Europe on the one side and Eastern Europe and the U.S. on the other, with the Western Europeans being unwilling to tolerate the wrath of Russia because of the behavior of the Americans, Poles and Czechs.”

“All of that looks illusory and extremely naive. If efforts to alienate Western Europe from the U.S. were fruitless in Soviet times, attempts by the militarily much-weakened “energy superpower” now will be dismissed completely by the European elite. Eastern
Europe will undoubtedly use the Russian missile threat for its own practical purposes. Finding themselves the frontline, at which the Russian “new SS-20s” are aimed, Poland
and the Czech Republic will justly be able to count on political and financial special treatment from their NATO allies.”

One of the first effects he sees of such a move would be to speed the deployment and possible expansion of missile defense forces in Europe. That might be a little too linear thinking, but understandable in light of the West’s ultimate reaction to the deployment of the SS-20 by deploying upgraded theater nuclear forces (Pershing II’s and GLCM’s) in the early 80’s. The present system would be significantly challenged by technical features (e.g., penetration aids), numbers (threats vs numbers of ground-based interceptors or GBIs) and intercept windows (window of opportunity to conduct an intercept) when faced with a possible Russian MR/IRBM series of launches.

Baranov alludes to the above and posits that the next step would be a deployment of new, more precise and thereby more lethal than their Russian counterpart, MR/IRBMs or Pershings as he labels them. He is rather quick to note that

“…Russia has no midrange missiles even in the design stage, while the U.S. is actively developing them for submarine use. What would stop them from creating a land version of the same missile? The Americans have a clear advantage in midrange ship-base cruise missiles, which could also be easily adapted to land use.”

(ed: there may be some mistaken consideration of US discussions over conventional Tridents here - something that the new SecDef has explicitly ruled out) Besides possibly prompting a symmetrical response from the US/NATO, Baranov criticizes the idea as being bad for Russia economically. Arguing that the current funding levels for production of ICBMs is already minimalist (net effect of the current construction program vs draw down/retirement of legacy missiles is a smaller force in 2015-18 than when all this began), he notes that opening of a new production line will only exacerbate the strategic nuclear environment by taking away from production of strategic missiles. In closing he does offer a couple of avenues of potential asymmetric response – the informal agreement between US and Russian leaders re. levels of tactical nuclear warheads and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. YHS would note, however, that in each of those areas, the Russians have already engaged in questionable practices that would dilute the impact of a chosen course of action using one of those venues. On balance, a pretty fair assessment and worth the time to read.

UPDATE

Came across this gem of a quote in a recent Moscow Daily commentary by Yuliya Latynina: "The Spinach Effect" who takes the government, and esp. the comments by the Chief of the General Staff, to task over withdrawing from the INF treaty:

Question three: Chief of the General Staff Baluyevskiy said that we could retaliate by withdrawing from the intermediate-range and shorter-range missile treaty. I would remind you: This is the treaty that the huge USSR signed when it realized that it was unable to resist the US Pershings in Europe. Fine! The United States threatens us – and we withdraw from the intermediate-range and shorter-range missile treaty. Translated from the language of our strategists, they have tried to intimidate a hedgehog with their bare ass. Their military budget is $518 billion, our entire GDP is only twice as much as that, and yet here we are, withdrawing from the intermediate-range and shorter-range missile treaty. So that the Americans might not deploy a missile defense system in the Czech Republic but some resurrected Pershings.

Now that is a turn of phrase one normally doesn't come across in the more mundane circles of strategy discussion...

Over at another site (RussianForces.org) there is a very good discussion/analysis of the current and future state of Russian strategic forces – all variants. Pavel Podvig’s “Russian strategic nuclear forces” website and blog is filled with detailed information on Russian forces on par wit what was found in the Nuclear Databook series by Cochran et al. In fact, Podvig was the translator of record who translated the volume from the Databook series on Russian forces an infrastructure into Russian and followed that up in the early 90’s with a new volume that added Russian sources.

Along with the website is a blog in the traditional sense. Again, the articles on the whole are balanced, thoughtful, technically rich and generally devoid of nationalistic bombast or propaganda. That is saved for the comments section which has its fair share of hard core Russian nationalists providing their input.

Of particular note is the most recent posting is a quick analysis of force structure out to 2015. What is immediately apparent from the graphs (replicated here) is the impact of legacy missiles (SS-18, SS-19, etc.) and block obsolescence. He does note that he is assessing the Topol-Ms produced in the outyears to be a 3-MIRV model, something about which there has been much speculation in the open press, but no open declaration to do so, probably until START I expires in 2009. There is also an assumption that the problems plaguing the Bulava SLBM will be rectified and production and deployment resumed, albeit in a delayed manner, to offset the rapid retirement of old SLBMs and subs.

A good site with valuable insight and information – I’ve added it to my blogroll.

- SJS

Cold Peace? Russia and the INF Treaty

“In connection with this I would like to recall that in the 1980s the USSR and the United States signed an agreement on destroying a whole range of small- and medium-range missiles but these documents do not have a universal character. Today many other countries have these missiles, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel. Many countries are working on these systems and plan to incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such weapons systems.”

“It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security”

With that statement, given in the context of the speech last week that criticized the US for unilateral action it would appear that Russia is preparing to unilaterally disengage from the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) treaty. Several commentators and analysts began to focus on this potential action late in the week, some with undiluted condemnation of the Bush Administration and dark warnings of a new Cold War.

To be sure, these pages do not and will not give a clean pass to Russia. Under President Putin we have seen a consolidation of power in a few organs of the national government, a willingness to provide support for known proliferators and agents provocateurs who seek to acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them and regain hegemony through the use of the oil weapon. Critics of these moves often find themselves the subject of extreme harassment or, increasingly so it seems, the target of an assassin. In the matter of the INF treaty though, one needs to stop and review the bidding before casting stones.

Historical Context

The INF Treaty was a signatory event – the first nuclear arms treaty that not only prohibited an entire class of weapon, but established the kind of intrusive inspection régime that was later instituted for the START accords. Nuclear configured intermediate range forces, especially missiles, were a major part of the heating up of the Cold War in the 1980’s. By the mid-1970’s, the Soviets had begun replacing older silo-based SS-4 and -5 IRBM/MRBMs with the road-mobile SS-20. The SS-20 was a substantial leap in capability and represented a significant increase in the threat posed by Soviet forces and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact against Western Europe. Derived from the first two stages of the SS-16 (one of the early attempts by the Soviets to develop a road mobile ICBM), the SS-20’s significantly increased throw-weight allowed it carry up to three multiple independently targeted warheads (MIRV) of 150 kilotons apiece. CEP was also markedly improved – from 5,000 meters (Soviet sources) for the SS-4 to less than 450 meters for the SS-20. With exceptional range (5,000-7500 km), allowing full coverage of Europe from deep within Russia and being road-mobile (easy concealment), the SS-20 was a counterforce weapon that had preemptive strike written all over it. When viewed in the context of the strategic nuclear parity achieved by the Soviets earlier in the 70’s, the deployment of the SS-20 threatened the umbrella of nuclear deterrence provided by US forces – the critical component of NATO. By threatening this guarantee, the Soviets hoped to “de-couple” Europe from its partner across the Atlantic. Given the state of US forces at the time, this was not altogether a path of questionable success.

Arrayed against the improved Soviet intermediate forces (they were also deploying the Backfire and SS-21) were a mixture of NATO MRBM’s and SLBM’s (to include the Pershing I and Polaris/Poseidon) and dual-use aircraft (F-111, F-4, A-6, Buccaneer, etc.). The bulk of these forces were US or had US dual-key control (as was the case with Pershing I’s under West German control). Lacking a definitive system (or systems) to directly counter the SS-20 deployment, the first step attempted to redress this imbalance was the consideration of deploying the Enhanced Radiation Weapon, aka the Neutron Bomb. However, in one of the most egregious decisions by President Carter and his administration, the US opted not to deploy the weapon (leaving it instead in “deployment ready” status in the US) which left Allied leadership (which had expended political capitol supporting this unpopular deployment) out on a limb. It seemed the goals of the Soviet plan to de-couple Europe from the US might indeed succeed.

On 12 Nov 79, after a two-year study, NATO ministers unanimously adopted a "dual track" strategy to counter Soviet SS-20 deployments. One track called for arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce INF forces to the lowest possible level; the second track called for deployment in Western Europe, beginning in December 1983, of 464 single-warhead U.S. ground-launched cruise (GLCM) missiles and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles. With strong leadership in place in Washington, London, Bonn and Rome following elections in the early 80’s, a united front was established and the Soviets walked out of the first round of negotiations in November, 1983. Deployment began the following month in spite of extensive protests in Europe and the US. Over the course of the next few years, the US and Soviet Union engaged in a series of proposals/counter-proposals and eventually, in July 87, the Soviets, under Gorbachev, agreed to a “double zero” proposal that would eliminate intermediate- and shorter-range missiles of the US and Soviet Union only, thereby not including the national forces of France and Britain. The treaty was signed 28 May 88 and entered into force 1 Jun 88. In late April and early May 91, the United States eliminated its last ground-launched cruise missile and ground-launched ballistic missile covered under the INF Treaty. The last declared Soviet SS-20 was eliminated on 11 May 91. A total of 2,692 missiles were eliminated after the Treaty's entry-into-force.

Today’s Ballistic Missile Environment and INF

In the intervening 16 years since the last US and Soviet intermediate range missile was destroyed, the world has seen a literal explosion in the development and/or deployment of medium- and intermediate range missiles by nations that were not party to the INF treaty. Chief among these nations are (or were) China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India. Indeed, it was the 1998 launch of a Taep’o-dong 1 ICBM/space launch vehicle prototype that prompted the Rumsfeld study and subsequent re-invigoration of the US ballistic missile defense program. In order to undertake that effort, the US, under the current administration, delivered notification to Russia that it was stepping away from the 1972 ABM Treaty, citing its need to develop defenses against limited attacks from states other than Russia or by a rogue entity. Note carefully the justification – we will see it again…

So we come to the speech, presented to a gathering of ministers of defense at a conference on security in Munich. Getting much play, early on after the conference was the calling out of the US’ actions as a hyper-power, not given to be constrained under the norms of international law (as if…) and making up some rather odd pairings in an effort to show superiority over US GDP (I mean, come on now – the BRIC countries, Brazil, Russia, India and China?). Buried in the text was the quote that started this article and only picked up by some commentators later in the week. Truth be told, YHS is not in the least surprised and had been expecting this for some few years. On the one hand, it is not the first time that Russia has raised the prospect. There were some indications as early as 1999 and as recently as March of 2005, with some in the Russian press attributing it to Rumsfeld as a twisted way for the US to resume nuclear testing.

Be that as it may, as soon as the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty, YHS’ internal clock started on Russia’s withdrawal from INF. That would be one reason. In the context of the speech last week, note that Putin ascribes Russian motives to being surrounded by nations with intermediate- and shorter range missiles (lifting the phrase directly from the treaty) including even, horrors, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. There are a few of us who note, somewhat wryly, that this is the result of so many (proliferated) chickens coming home to roost. A look at the “threatening” countries is a veritable “Who’s Who” of former Soviet- and current Russian arms clients for anything up to and including – ballistic missiles. A third reason is cash – cold, hard arms sales cash. The market for proven, reliable ballistic missiles is far from sated. Credit the Russians with building lethal, reliable and proven ballistic missiles of all stripes (save the occasional, well, maybe more than occasional Bulava failure). Being able to market MRBMs and IRBMs that were derived from a proven ICBM like the SS-25 – a road mobile, solid fuel missile, could prove to be an irresistible draw in the current market. If it complicates the hated American missile defense system, especially in light of plans for a third site based in Europe, then all the better. Of course there is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which is a voluntary effort to stem the spread of technologies associated with the design, development and production of ballistic missiles. MTCR controls have worked exceptionally well, especially in the cases of North Korea, India, Pakistan and Iran, for example, and China too (especially in the case of transfer of guidance control improvements from US commercial interests). As the fact sheet from the Arms Control Association puts it:

“Because the regime is voluntary and the decision to export is the sole responsibility of each member, the MTCR has no penalties for transfers of controlled items. However, U.S. law mandates that Washington sanction entities-individuals, companies, or governments (whether they are MTCR members or not)-exporting MTCR-controlled items to certain countries identified as proliferators or potential threats to U.S. security. Sanctions may also be levied if the United States judges the transfer contrary to the MTCR. Typically, Washington prohibits the charged entity from signing contracts, receiving aid, or buying arms from the U.S. government for a period of two years. Sometimes the penalties can be imposed for longer lengths of time or extended to commercial imports and exports as well.”

Yes, well one can see how if Russia decided to enter the ballistic missile market with new/improved missiles that they would be grievously put off by US sanctions. To those who would argue that how could Russia export such weapons and the danger they pose to her own self-interest, YHS would simply respond that were that the case we would not be seeing such a cozy nuclear relationship that is a-budding between Russia and Iran.

If that weren’t enough, another deadline lurks in the near future – the expiration of START I in 2009. Russia has already made it clear their intention to develop MIRV capabilities for the road-mobile SS-25 and the silo-based variant, SS-27. Combined with Russia’s re-assertiveness fueled by arms and petroleum sales abroad, consolidation of power at home and hand-picked heirs that will likely continue these policies, Russian withdrawal from the INF treaty will bear close scrutiny for the real, vice stated rational and purpose and what that portends for future relations with the US. May be not a return to the days of the Cold War, but instead a Cold Peace…

- SJS