“In connection with this I would like to recall that in the 1980s the
“It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security”
With that statement, given in the context of the speech last week that criticized the US for unilateral action it would appear that Russia is preparing to unilaterally disengage from the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) treaty. Several commentators and analysts began to focus on this potential action late in the week, some with undiluted condemnation of the Bush Administration and dark warnings of a new Cold War.
To be sure, these pages do not and will not give a clean pass to
The INF Treaty was a signatory event – the first nuclear arms treaty that not only prohibited an entire class of weapon, but established the kind of intrusive inspection régime that was later instituted for the START accords. Nuclear configured intermediate range forces, especially missiles, were a major part of the heating up of the Cold War in the 1980’s. By the mid-1970’s, the Soviets had begun replacing older silo-based SS-4 and -5 IRBM/MRBMs with the road-mobile SS-20. The SS-20 was a substantial leap in capability and represented a significant increase in the threat posed by Soviet forces and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact against
Arrayed against the improved Soviet intermediate forces (they were also deploying the Backfire and SS-21) were a mixture of NATO MRBM’s and SLBM’s (to include the Pershing I and Polaris/Poseidon) and dual-use aircraft (F-111, F-4, A-6, Buccaneer, etc.). The bulk of these forces were US or had US dual-key control (as was the case with Pershing I’s under West German control). Lacking a definitive system (or systems) to directly counter the SS-20 deployment, the first step attempted to redress this imbalance was the consideration of deploying the Enhanced Radiation Weapon, aka the Neutron Bomb. However, in one of the most egregious decisions by President Carter and his administration, the
On 12 Nov 79, after a two-year study, NATO ministers unanimously adopted a "dual track" strategy to counter Soviet SS-20 deployments. One track called for arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce INF forces to the lowest possible level; the second track called for deployment in Western Europe, beginning in December 1983, of 464 single-warhead U.S. ground-launched cruise (GLCM) missiles and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles. With strong leadership in place in
Today’s Ballistic Missile Environment and INF
In the intervening 16 years since the last US and Soviet intermediate range missile was destroyed, the world has seen a literal explosion in the development and/or deployment of medium- and intermediate range missiles by nations that were not party to the INF treaty. Chief among these nations are (or were)
So we come to the speech, presented to a gathering of ministers of defense at a conference on security in
Be that as it may, as soon as the
“Because the regime is voluntary and the decision to export is the sole responsibility of each member, the MTCR has no penalties for transfers of controlled items. However,
U.S.law mandates that Washingtonsanction entities-individuals, companies, or governments (whether they are MTCR members or not)-exporting MTCR-controlled items to certain countries identified as proliferators or potential threats to security. Sanctions may also be levied if the U.S. judges the transfer contrary to the MTCR. Typically, United States Washingtonprohibits the charged entity from signing contracts, receiving aid, or buying arms from the government for a period of two years. Sometimes the penalties can be imposed for longer lengths of time or extended to commercial imports and exports as well.” U.S.
Yes, well one can see how if
If that weren’t enough, another deadline lurks in the near future – the expiration of START I in 2009.