Tuesday's Roll-up of Missile News and Notes

Missile and other news and notes from around the ‘sphere:

MANPADs vs Helos

Lots of concern/interest in countering the MANPAD (MAN Portable Air Defense) missiles in the wake of increased helo loses these past couple of weeks. While the CH-46 loss that has gained so much coverage appears to have been mechanical in nature (Update: DoD confirmed on 14 Feb that the CH-46 was in fact, shot down and did not crash due to mechanical failure), open press reporting speculates others have succumbed to a variety of weapons up to and including MANPADs. Most likely what we are seeing are newer missile variants starting to appear in theater. Small arms and RPG fire, while potentially lethal in certain restricted confines, are less likely to be the source in a more open scenario, and doubly so when considering armored attack helos like the Apache.

Older missiles used a proximity fuze for detonation in the vicinity of the target aircraft, a reflection of the relatively lower degree of sophistication and discrimination capabilities (clutter rejection, counter-counter measures, etc.) OTOH, newer missiles use discrimination features that not only are contact fuzed, but seek to impart the most damage in the most vulnerable areas – to the point they can discern between single/multi-engine aircraft and helos and target the vulnerable areas accordingly. The warheads themselves are increasingly complex and lethal, such as sending a dense stream of high-speed projectiles into the target and having secondary fuzing to detonate any fuel cloud resulting from the initial hit.

Yeah, pretty nasty stuff, and all the more reason to hold helo folks who are working/flying down in the weeds in greater esteem.

What would be the insurgent’s CONOPS in stepping up the campaign against helos? Couple of points – recall the morale boost it gave the Afghans to have something they could effectively employ against the Soviet’s Hind helos (aka “Devil’s Chariot”). It forced the Soviets to change their operating procedures and flight heights. A similar effect in the ongoing battle for Baghdad and other urban areas would force (in the insurgent’s eyes) the US to operate its helos in a more circumspective manner and thereby give back the urban roof top environs to the insurgents. Of course that is a pretty simplistic CONOPS and ignores other variables such as persistent ISR from UAVs operating above MANPAD ceilings, deployment of more effective countermeasures and changes in tactics and employment. Bottom-line – while we haven’t seen the last of these losses, my money is still on our helos and their crews prevailing.

Oh, and for reference, the defenses being currently explored for civilian airliner defense are only up to base-Stinger level – technology that is 20+years old…

North Korean Nuclear Agreement?

The United States and four other nations reached a tentative agreement to provide North Korea with roughly $400 million in fuel oil and aid, in return for the North’s starting to disable its nuclear facilities and allowing nuclear inspectors back into the country, according to American officials who have reviewed the proposed text. While the accord sets a 60-day deadline for North Korea to accomplish those first steps toward disarmament, it leaves until an undefined moment in the future — and to another negotiation — the actual removal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the fuel that it has manufactured to produce them. Bush administration officials said they believed that the other nations participating in the talks … would consent to the tentative agreement as soon as Tuesday. … In essence, if the North agrees to the deal, a country that only four months ago conducted its first nuclear test will have traded away its ability to produce new nuclear fuel in return for immediate energy and other aid. It would still hold on to, for now, an arsenal that American intelligence officials believe contains more than a half-dozen nuclear weapons or the fuel that is their essential ingredient. The accord also leaves unaddressed the fate of a second and still-unacknowledged nuclear weapons program that the United States accused North Korea of buying from the Pakistani nuclear engineer Abdul Qadeer Khan in the late 1990s … Negotiations had appeared near collapse on Sunday over North Korea’s demands for huge shipments of fuel oil and electricity. … (source: New York Times, February 13, 2007)

No More Chinese ASAT Tests?

In the wake of the firestorm of protest over last month’s test comes this item:

China's National Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan says there won't be a repeat of the Jan. 11 anti-satellite weapon test that scattered more than 900 trackable pieces of debris across the most heavily used satellite orbits in space. (ed: that number continues to grow – some now say over 1140 pieces) Fukushiro Nukaga, the former Japanese minister of state for defense, told reporters in Tokyo that during a meeting in Beijing Cao also repeated past Chinese denials that the test was a hostile act. … (source: Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, February 13, 2007) (ed: Also have to wonder how much internal, um, recalibration has been applied to the armed forces in what appears to have been a test carried out without fully informing senior civilian leadership…)

Wednesday Roll-up of Missile News

Continuing the themes from yesterday’s post:

a. India plans aerospace military command to oversee space-based assets: In yet more fallout from China’s ASAT test comes the announcement from India that they intend to “create an aerospace command to control and protect satellites and spacecraft orbiting the Earth.” Air Chief Marshal Shashi Tyagi said India was an aerospace power with "transoceanic reach" and it was important for it to be able to exploit outer space. "As the reach of the Indian Air Force is expanding it has become extremely important that we exploit space, and for it you need space assets." Tyagi's comments follow a Chinese anti-satellite weapons test on Jan. 11 in which it used a missile to shoot down an old weather satellite. Additionally comes word of India working on development of missile shield for satellites. (from IRNA, New Delhi, Jan 23) Fearing that its satellites could be under threat from missiles, India is working on development of a shield for which it is in talks with Russia and other countries having such technology. … China has recently tested one such missile, but the official underlined that India's desire to develop the shield was not prompted by that development. … He said India has been talking to "close friend" Russia and other countries having such technology "for our interest." Besides Russia and China, the technology is available only to the US.

b. Russia Condemns European-based Missile Defense Plans: Russia continues to bang the drum over its extreme displeasure at the prospect of certain elements of the ground-based ballistic missile defense system being installed in Europe, especially in the area formerly known as Eastern Europe and part of the “Near Beyond” about which the Russians have historically been concerned. At issue is location of a ground-based radar site and interceptor field that would provide intercept coverage of US- and European-bound ICBM’s launched from the Middle East (presumably Iran). The current system lacks that capability with the preponderance of its fixed-base radars located in/around the Pacific and interceptors based in Alaska. This current, limited capability is geared against a threat originating from North Korea. Location of a radar site in the Czech Republic and a missile field in Poland by 2012 would go a substantial distance to mitigating the emerging threat from South West Asia. The system continues to grow and evolve – but per force, will always be several steps in capability and numbers behind the kind of offensive nuclear strike capability present in the Russian nuclear inventory, as well as the growing inventory and capability of China. Therefore arguments by Russian defense and foreign ministry officials that this represents an offensive threat or ratcheting up of the arms race are specious at best. The real issue is the view, perceived or real, of loss of influence in areas where once they held sway. Estonia’s recent law to remove Soviet-era war memorials (viewed more as emblematic of Soviet occupation than liberation), for example, invoked similar sharp responses, near hysteric rhetoric from Russian officials and the Russian parliament.

c. Shack – Successful THAAD test: CNN.com, January 27, 2007. The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency shot down a dummy target missile over the southern Pacific Ocean during a test of the U.S. missile defense shield early Saturday … First, a dummy ballistic missile was fired from a U.S. mobile launch platform in the Pacific Ocean in a simulated attack. Moments later, an interceptor missile was fired from the agency's missile range facility on Hawaii's Kauai Island and struck the dummy warhead over the Pacific Ocean, military footage showed. The mobile, ground-based system is designed to protect the United States from short to intermediate-range high altitude ballistic missile attacks in the North American region, agency spokeswoman Pam Rogers said. The system "intercepts missiles that are shorter range and at the end of their flight trajectory. It is part of the ballistic missile defense system, a layered system that is designed to intercept all types of missiles in all phases of flights," Rogers said. This particular short to intermediate-range interceptor system has been tested four times a year since 2005. "This was our first test since we moved equipment in October from the White Sands missile range in New Mexico ... everything went exceedingly well," Rogers said. (ed: Continued strong comeback for the once sorely troubled THAAD program following a thorough restructuring).

d. Central Command Nominee Cites Naval, Missile Defense (Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, January 31, 2007): U.S. Navy Adm. William Fallon, head of Pacific Command, would emphasize greater missile defense, as well as naval and air superiority in the Persian Gulf and Middle East if he becomes head of Central Command, according to sentiments expressed at his Jan. 30 nomination hearing in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Fallon told senators there was no doubt that North Korea and Iran were exchanging ballistic missile technology and that Iran appears to be shaping its military to deny U.S. aircraft carriers, precision strike and submarine capabilities in the Gulf, or at least to keep them at a distance. The country also is attempting to boost its power through asymmetric means, such as supporting international terrorism and pursuing nuclear weapons, he further said in prepared answers to advance congressional questions. … Fallon, who would be the first admiral to lead CENTCOM, said he figured his nomination stemmed in part from an effort to manage the Middle East "neighborhood" around Iran while Iraq operations will be largely left to Army Gen. David Petraeus.

Tuesday's Roll-up of Missile/Nuclear News

Reverberations continue this week over the Chinese ASAT test and allegations of Iranian and North Korean cooperative development of nukes and long range missiles; meanwhile Iran continues to rattle the cage with announcement of another Shahab-3 test and a “new” sub-surface ship killer missile; India announces its intent to establish a dedicated aerospace defense command (don’t call it an Indian NORAD though since they aren’t partnering w/China or Pakistan…); Russia continues to push back hard against deploying ground-based elements of the US’ ballistic missile defense system (BMDS). Lots of stuff to cover – we’ll hit the first two today and follow with the rest tomorrow:

a. ASAT Fallout. The magnitude of the debris issue (as first pointed out in these posts here and here) continues to grow. To bring the esoteric into a framework readily understood, the Center for Space Standards and Innovation has developed a hi-res video here (quicktime variant sans music is also available on the site). What it truly illustrates is (1) the crossing danger to the ISS and other platforms, manned or not, in an equatorial orbit and (later) a sense of the size of the debris field in relation to all the other objects currently on orbit. Arms Control Wonk also has an aptly titled article re. same subject. If you want to roll up your sleeves and get into the mechanics of kinetic kill ASATs, check out this paper .

b. Iran, North Korea; missiles and nukes. A target rich environment, as the saying goes. Towards the end of last weeks’ round of wargames/missile tests, the Iranians tested another Shahab-3 (last test was part of the Noble Prophet round in Nov ’06). A spokesman for Iran’s foreign ministry indicated this was the final test before handing the missile over to the army for operations. The Shahab has been in development since 1998 and reputedly it or a variant forms the core of a Taepo Dong-like satellite launcher announced by the Iranians last week. According to the article in this week’s Aviation Week & Space Technology (subscription may be required) the payload would be a 44-lb satellite that would be not much more than a radio transmitter – about what Sputnik was. The launcher would most likely consist of a liquid-fueled 1^st (Shahab-3 or -3 derived) and 2^nd stage (Scud B) and an indigenously developed solid fuel third stage, likely using a Chinese design, possibly with strap-on solid fuel boosters for the first stage. Launch would likely be on a southerly heading from central Iran (site of most of the long-range testing) out over the Indian Ocean. On the ballistic missile front, one of the implications of a successful satellite launch would be further development to loft heavier payloads (and the implications that has for development/deployment of nuclear warheads) and increased complexities for Israel’s Arrow ABM because of the increased speed and steeper angle of re-entry of the warhead. This in turn, would drive Israel to look at either improving its Arrow system or acquiring a US system like THAAD which is oriented to intercepting higher-speed targets in the terminal phase. (ed: Of course the real irony here lies in the criminalization of private ownership of satellite dishes by the great unwashed public whilst the powers-that-be announce their intention to orbit a satellite...)

Over on the nuke front, speculation continues over just what form or line of development an Iranian nuke program might be taking. Essentially, there are two types of devices that can serve as either a weapon in their own right, or as a trigger for a boosted device or thermonuclear device – implosion or gun. The gun design essentially smashes two masses together to cause a critical mass and nuclear detonation. This was used in the “Little Man” bomb dropped on Hiroshima. While simple(r) in design than an implosion device, it still is nonetheless a complex beast, has a smaller yield and drives other design issues that make it less than favorable for the linear acceleration g’s experienced in missile launches. The implosion device, where you have a physics package or “pit” made of a sphere of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, is more amenable to tighter packaging though getting the conventional explosion just right for implosion can be a trick. Also the material used, HeU or Pu will drive the size of the pit and complexity of calculations for explosion. This is why even a failed test (like the North Koreans had in Oct 07) will still provide useful data. See Paul Kerry’s blog for more on this idea. More about nuke weapons design at the Nuclear Weapons archive – scroll down the page and look under “Reference” for comparisons of the two devices mentioned above. Where the nuclear cooperation would come into play would be any lessons learned the North Koreans would pass along to the Iranians (for the right price) from their October test as alleged in an article in the Telegraph . Whether the meetings that the article states began in November of ’05 really took place is a point of dispute with denials by several high-ranking officials of the story’s validity. Secretary of State Rice has gone on the record as saying the report wasn’t based on anything she has seen. Given the cooperation seen in the development of the Iranian missile program, supported by North Korea (and China, and Pakistan and other proliferators…) one is hard pressed to be so dismissive about similar undertakings in the nuclear world, a condition that is aggravated by Iran’s lack of transparency in their nuclear program.

One other, and lesser heralded, event from last week's round of tests was the demonstration of a surface ship firing a rocket-propelled torpedo at another distant surface target. While boasting (again) of indigenous design, it most likely is an export version of the Russian VA-111 Shkvall ("Squall") and mirrors an ealier demonstration last spring.

North Korean - Iranian Cooperative Ventures

Some increased levels of chatter these past few days re. cooperation between Iran and NK in nuclear weapons and missile fields. First up, the nuclear issue:

• NORTH KOREA HELPING IRANIANS TO SET UP NUKE TEST: REPORT: KOREANS SHARING THEIR TEST RESULTS, The VancouverProvince (British Columbia), January 24, 2007. North KoreaIran to prepare an underground nuclear test similar to the one Pyongyang carried out last year, according to a senior European Union defense official. Under the terms of a new understanding between the two countries, the North Koreans have agreed to share all the data and information they received from their successful test last October with Tehran's nuclear scientists. … A senior European defense official told the Daily Telegraph that North Korea had invited a team of Iranian nuclear scientists to study the results of the underground test to assist Tehran's preparations to conduct its own -- possibly by the end of this year. There were unconfirmed reports at the time of the Korean firing that an Iranian team was present. Iranian military advisers regularly visit North Korea to participate in missile tests. Now the long-standing military co-operation between the countries has been extended to nuclear issues. …Same story was carried by Reuters and Haaretz.

In an interview last night on Tehran television, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad said Iran will resist pressures because its nuclear activities are “transparent”. “Our logic is clear. We have had the greatest cooperation with the IAEA… because we are transparent and we like our nuclear dossier to be investigated transparently and that is the reason why we are insisting on this issue.” As a member of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is legally entitled to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. “We have acted legally.”

Of course, no mention was made of the 38 IAEA inspectors who were barred from entering the country on Monday... Transparency yes, just not in the way the world expects it.

Over at Arms Control Today is an article about a possible new type missile (call it the No Dong B) that is a purported derivative of an early generation Soviet SLBM, the SS-N-6.

• Perhaps the most important recent development is Iran’s apparent purchase from North Korea of missiles with a range possibly exceeding that of Tehran’s longest-range deployed ballistic missile, the Shahab-3. The Israeli newspaper Ha`aretz quoted Major General Amos Yadlin, the head of the Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Branch, as saying that Tehran had purchased the missiles, some of which had already arrived in Iran. A knowledgeable former Department of State official told Arms Control Today Dec. 19 that the reports are “certainly credible.”

The United States believes that North Korea has been deploying the same missile, which is reportedly based on the Soviet SS-N-6. Washington believes Pyongyang is deploying the missile in a road-mobile mode, although the SS-N-6 was a submarine-launched ballistic missile.

The United States and South Korea estimate that the missile, which North Korea has never tested, could potentially have a range of 2,500-4,000 kilometers, according to press reports. The most advanced version of the SS-N-6 had an estimated range of 3,000 kilometers. Any new missile’s range would vary considerably depending on the size of its payload.

During a Nov. 12 television interview, Major General Yahya Rahim-Safavi, commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps indicated that Iran tested a Shahab-3 capable of traveling 2,000 kilometers. Tehran has previously claimed to possess a missile with such a range.

The noteworthy item about this development is not that we can expect to see NK SSBN's putting to sea anytime in the near (or far) future with a loadout of SLBMs. Rather, it is that the same characteristics that make an SLBM attractive also make it attractive for road mobile applications. Indeed, the Russians are attempting this same feat in reverse with a SLBM variant of the SS-27, the Bulava (which has had multiple launch failures). Add in the fact that Iran and NK are closely allied in missile development (Iranian observers were reportedly present for Kim's July 4/5 fireworks show, including the failed TD-2 launch) and such a missile would be imminently attractive to the Iranians for its range and mobility as well as throw weight. The early models of the SS-N-6 could deliver a 1500 lb warhead over a distance of 1300 nm (later mods up to 1900 nm).

The SS-N-6 is not a solid fuel rocket, using instead storable liquid fuel, which is a step up from the liquid fuel used now in the various Shahab variants, but not as great a leap to solid fuel. Additionally, while 1500 lb is a substantial payload (and close to the Sahab's estimated 1100-1500 lb payload) an early Iranian nuclear weapon is likely to weigh more than that. It was almost a decade before the US finally developed a warhead that weighed in the 1,000 lb range that could be adapted to a missile (the W7 -- 890 - 1000 lb, 2-40 kt yield).

Still, when all is said and done, it is well worth keeping one's eyes on this synergistic combination (nuclear and missile testing/support) between Iran and NK... The prospect of nuclear capable, road-mobile missiles able to range goodly portions of Europe (and Russia) should give pause to think to our erstwhile allies and is one of the driving forces behind the so-called "third site" BMD system being examined for European basing (and will be subject of a forthcoming post).

- SJS

Flightdeck Friday - Nuclear Fleas

Last week we went big – big planes, big ships, big nukes, big hair (no wait, that’s another story...). This week we go to the other end of the spectrum.

Arms Race - 1950

1950 and the nuclear arms race is well and truly underway. The Soviets had surprised the world with their first nuclear detonation the previous year at Semipalatinsk – a good 5 or more years earlier than the intel community had predicted. In a remote part of Kazakhstan, Sergei Korolev and a group of engineers were embarked on another endeavor which would prove equal, if not greater shock to the Free World seven years later. In the US, the press was on for both the “Super” (a thermonuclear device) and miniaturization of weapons for carriage on a wider variety of aircraft.

At Los Alamos, scientists and engineers of Sandia labs were working on producing a weapon smaller than the Mk 5, which was a more efficient implosion device, similar to “Fat Man” but suitable only for internal carriage on bomber aircraft. The core of the Mk7 was scaled down in size from that of the Mk5, retaining the same 92-point HE (high explosive) geometry of the Mk5. Similar economies of scale were realized with the common components with the Mk5 (e.g., arming, fuzing, and firing equipment of the HE core). Reduced in size (and weight) the now “lighter” Mk7, weighing in at some 1700 lbs, could be placed in a shape streamlined for supersonic, external carriage. Douglas Aircraft Company was contracted to develop the shell and interface for the weapon. Significant changes were required in the approach to arming and safing nuclear weapons now as well with external carriage. Previously, arming was accomplished by in-flight insertion of the physics package, thereby safing the weapon for launch/recoveries. Obviously, that would not be the case with tactical aircraft.

Code-named Thor, the Mk7 would be comprised (initially) of the Mk7 Mod 0 weapon and Mk 5 Mod 0 barometric fuse. The use of the latter ensured the earliest possible entry to operational use, but would require specialized delivery tactics and use of dive brakes on the weapon to ensure subsonic deliveries. Proof testing of the Thor concept was conducted during Operation Buster-Jangle test series, conducted at the (then) new Nevada proving grounds in late 1951 with yields of 3 – 31 Kt. With continued testing and refinement, an “emergency capability” was available by May of 1952. Later in 1952, the USAF embarked on a series of tests with the Low Altitude Bombing System (LABS) that showed the Mk7 could be safely and accurately released at angles of up to 75 degrees. Further work on and incorporation of a radar fuzing system to the barometric and contact/timer fuses formed the basis of the production model Mk7. Full production began in November 1952 and ran until February 1963 with the weapon remaining in the inventory until final retirement in 1967. A total of 17-1800 were produced.

The 'Competition'

While the Air Force was busy adapting some of its tactical aircraft for carriage of the Mk7 (notably the F-84F, -84G and F-100), the Navy was slower to adapt tactical aircraft. In part, this was due to resistance form the heavy attack community (which had the A3D in the pipeline), but a concerted effort on the par to of a core of Naval aviators, chief among them being CAPT Ramage (assigned to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project at the time) and VADM T. L. Sprague, COMNAVAIRPAC started to turn this thinking around. Envisioning wide deployment among the many Essex class carriers still in the fleet (Note: at the time, only the larger Midway class were “nuclear capable” with their complements of AJ Savages – and these chiefly on the Atlantic coast) they also saw this as a means of forestalling monopoly of nuclear weapons by SAC. A successful demonstration of a Mk7 training shape with an AD on USS Princeton led to a series of briefings by a three man team, led by Ramage and consisting of a couple of academics from Sandia labs (CDR Jack Sloatman and Ted Youngs) set off to convince others of the efficacy of tactical jets carrying nukes off the smaller decks. Eventually they presented their arguments to SECNAV, Dan Kimball who was so impressed he set up an appointment for the team to present their proposal to CNO, who was duly impressed.

In the meantime, Douglas Aircraft was also noticeably busy, and not just from developing the A3D and nuclear weapons aero-shells. Work on a successor to the venerable AD was underway in the form of the A2D Skyshark. Basically starting off as an AD body mated to a turboprop, the XA2D evolved into a different aircraft in its own right. Twin counter-rotating props were mounted to an Allison T-40 turboprop engine. The program, however, was encountering severe setbacks, including one instance where the aircraft shed its props during a test flight. Clearly a replacement was needed and once again, Ed Heinemann led the way with another inspired design.

More Inspired Design from Ed H.

Examining the growing weight and complexity of modern combat aircraft, Heinemann’s team worked to reduce both and provide the Navy a proposal that was half of the 30,000 lb official specification. The Navy placed an order for a prototype and some pre-production model and thus the AD4 (later A-4) Skyhawk was born. With a small wingspan based on a modified delta planform, the AD4 shed the requirement for folding wings (wing span was a mere 27 ft – compare to the A3D at 72 ft). Without the compromise required of folded wings, the AD4 sported a much stronger, 3-spar wing with integral fuel tanks. The weight saving paid off in the form of a weight-carrying capability of around 5,000 lbs of mixed conventional and nuclear ordnance and fuel tanks. Working on the design of the Mk7, Douglas Aircraft had an idea of the compromises required by the size of the tactical nuke, especially when examining older aircraft designed before the Mk7 and the carriage challenges it provided (for example, the struts on the F2H-2 had to be over-inflated to accommodate the Mk7 and also carried a significant recovery-weight constraint). The characteristic “stilt” landing gear of the AD4 was but one direct result of addressing these limitations.

The XA4D-1 prototype first flew on 22 Jun 1954 and was followed by the first of the pre-production models in August of that year. Production AD4-1’s followed in September 1956 with initial deliveries to VA-72. The AD4-2 (later A-4B) differed form the -1 models in many details, chief of which were a slightly more powerful J65 engine (7800 lb static thrust vs. 7700 lb s.t.) and most importantly, in-flight refueling capability. The A-4B provided a significant boost to the Navy’s nuclear capabilities when it deployed. By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Navy had the capability to deploy nuclear strikes across a broad range of mission areas – from long-range penetration as provided by the A3D (and soon, the new A-6 Intruder) from the big deck super carriers to short/medium range from Essex class CVs as provided by the Skyhawk and Skyraider. Of course these were also available from the big decks as well.

LABS

(From Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers):

Practicing the delivery tactics was fun with the LABS. A pilot approached the target at an altitude as low as he wanted, at a speed of 500 knots for jets. As he crossed over the IP or the target itself, depending on if he was going to loft/toss or do the OTS (Over The Shoulder) delivery, he pushed a bomb-release pickle on the control stick and started a 4-G pull up, now concentrating on the LABS instrument in the cockpit. The instrument gave an indication of wings level and vertical directional stability, plus the amount of deviation from the required 4-G force level. If the plane were steady in the pull-up, the crosshairs on the instrument remained in perfect horizontal/vertical presentation. When the bomb release pickle was pressed, a whistling tone was broadcast in the pilot's earphones and remained on until the bomb released, at approximately 45 degrees for the loft/toss maneuver and 110 degrees for the OTS. At that time the pilot could start his escape maneuver, rolling out or performing whatever routine he elected for escape.

Passing the Torch

However, change was afoot and soon the primary nuclear attack mission would be assumed by Polaris-equipped SSBNs which could provide a secure deterrent from their submerged patrols. Nevertheless, the conventional capabilities of these same aircraft would soon serve requirements in the skies over Southeast Asia very well. Nuclear capabilities would still be maintained by carriers through the remainder of the Cold War, finally being removed at the end of that period with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Sources:

Hansen, Chuck. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History, 1988.

Miller, Jerry. Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers: How The Bomb Saved Naval Aviation. Smithsonian Institute Press, 2001.

Swanborough, Gordon and Bowers, Peter M, United States Navy Aircraft since 1911. Naval Institute Press, 1990.

Cochran, Thomas; Arkin, William and Hoenig, Milton M. Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume 1, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities. Ballinger Publishing, 1984.