(As promised in this post, 2007 will see this blog cover more of the threats and concerns posed by China, Russia and other countries like Venezuela. Most of the China postings will be collected under the "Assassin's Mace" or Shashou Jiang identifier. - SJS)
The phrase "assassin's mace" is the English translation of "shashou jiang," a term of ancient Chinese strategy. "shashou jiang" was a club with which the "assassin" incapacitated his enemy, suddenly and totally, instead of fighting him according to "the rules."
Disclaimer: the following scenario is based on open sources, is admittedly simplistic and intended as a strawman for exposition and discussion. A more detailed endeavor would likely crossover into areas above and beyond the classification level of this site and audience.
June 2015. Tensions have escalated between the People’s Republic and
Aboard the GW, orders for an immediate course change and speed increase to flank are passed and executed by the CSG, which also serves to open formation. On the Reagan, efforts to weigh anchor and get underway are sped up, but it still looks like it will be another 5-10 minutes before she will be making effective way. In the meantime the AEGIS BMD cruisers and destroyers with the CSGs and on BMD patrol are cuing their search to the limited reports coming in. Before the loss of the SBIRS satellites, 10 IR events were associated with Tai-Hang and another 15 at Chuxiong. Initial assessments are a series of DF-21 and -31 launches – preliminary trajectories put Guam, Okinawa and the
Aboard the Reagan the bridge crew is witness to the SM-3’s bright streaks of light over the horizon as they reach out to attempt an intercept. General quarters have already been sounded and Zebra set throughout the ship when from high overhead an intermittent incandescent flash momentarily blossoms – once, twice. Fractions of a second later multiple explosions strike Reagan. Fire erupts on the flight deck as aircraft and equipment are destroyed. High up on the island, the radar and communications equipment are reduced to tatters. Casualties are many, but not as bad as it would have been if the carrier had been at flight quarters. However, except for the aircraft which had been wisely stricken below to the hangar bay, Reagan’s airwing was effectively destroyed. Still afloat, fighting fires and working damage control, Reagan would be effectively unavailable for many months while repairs would be made. On board the GW, the nearby sea erupts as the submunitions dispensed by the DF-21 MaRV’s explode. Suddenly a huge ball of flame and smoke, followed closely by the rolling thunder of the explosion, form where once was the USNS Alan Sheppard (the T-AKE servicing GWCSG with stores and ammo). Reports start filtering in from the rest of the CSG – some minor damage for a couple of the destroyers. Over on the Yukon though, more bad news as she has come to a stop and has begun a list to port, her crew fighting fires and hull damage while precious JP flows to the sea. GW herself has suffered no hits.
‘What if-ing’ is an interesting exercise and there is always the tendency to make the opponent 10 feet tall. In light of this, how plausible is the above scenario? Let’s break it down by significant components, and then look at some of the challenges for both sides.
DF-21 (NATO code-name: CSS-5) and DF-31(NATO codename: CSS-9): The older design of the two, the DF-21 (DF: Dong Feng or East Wind) is a solid-fuel, road mobile missile that replaced the CSS-2 (single stage, liquid fuel, transportable IRBM w/range of 2,650 km), beginning in the mid-90s. The DF-21 has a range of 2-2500 km (depending on variant) conventionally armed, or up to 1800 km with a 500 kt nuclear warhead. The most recent variant, the Mod 2 version, apparently is modeled on the former US Pershing II (former because the Pershing II was eliminated under the INF Treaty), employing an advanced terminal imaging radar and endo-atmospheric maneuvering to increase accuracy to 300m. As of mid-1995 the DF-21 was deployed at two main operating bases, one in Tonghua near
The DF-31 is an intercontinental-range, road-mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missile developed by
MaRV (Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle) development and use. Related to the MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle – MIRV’s can be MaRV’s), a MaRV is an individual re-entry vehicle which does not follow a strict ballistic trajectory, but maneuvers or changes direction as it comes down. These can be guided MaRV’s, which might use aerodynamic features (fins) or maneuvering rockets to alter course and GPS, inertial guidance or terminal homers (radar or IR) to acquire a target. Alternately, they might simply be RVs with an asymmetric shape, causing them to spiral or tumble as they re-enter the atmosphere. The original impetus behind MaRVs was defeat of ABM systems by out-maneuvering interceptor missiles. Mind you, we’re not talking dog-fighting type turning engagements between an RV re-entering the atmosphere at better than Mach 8 versus an interceptor – leave that to
- Tattletales: Able to provide the most timely and accurate information as to location, type and operations. Also likely to be the first to fire on the CSG, or alternately, absorb the first hit from the counter-tattletale (it is by no accident that the missile tubes on the mod-Kashin pointed aft instead of forward…). Subs (especially those armed w/ASCMs) might also fulfill the role of tattletale, though the requirement to provide frequent updates to shore-based C2 facilities, for example, could prove their undoing at the hands of the CSG organic ASW assets.
- Reconnaissance aircraft: It’s a big ocean. Recce aircraft are range and station time limited, especially in the open ocean areas. Through maneuver, emissions control, and deception a CSG can be a very difficult thing to find – in the open ocean. Just ask any carrier aviator who has tried to find the ship at night or under EMCON conditions and they will underscore that point. As the littorals are approached though, the task of avoiding detection becomes correspondingly tougher as the number of aircraft can be increased for both area coverage and once located, dwell time. Still, if it is radar-only coverage, especially in limited visibility conditions and areas of high traffic, the advantage could shift to the CSG.
(again) has popularized the all-seeing/all-knowing aspect of space-based surveillance. To be sure, electro-optic, radar- and ELINT satellites, as well as the Mark 1 Mod 0 eyeball have all been employed with varying degrees of success from Earth orbit. Radar satellites require copious amounts of power, are by nature large arrays and readily identifiable by orbital characteristics. The Soviets expended considerable effort in this area with little return. Why? Like EO, it is a matter of limited dwell time due to orbital mechanics. To be effective, a constellation of radar satellites must be maintained on orbit to gain the coverage in low earth orbit required of these platforms. Owing to either the size, power requirements, electro-optics or all of the above, considerable expense is engendered in building, launching and maintaining these vehicles. By all accounts, the Soviets had one of the most robust conventional/heavy lift launch programs through the 80s and 90s (while the Hollywood , on the other hand, concentrated its launch requirements on the temperamental and expensive shuttle system). Even so, they were limited in what could be put up (conservative estimates place the size of a RORSAT or EO system somewhere between the size of a semi-trailer and a single-wide mobile home. These issues (dwell, lift, and cost) are exacerbated where human observers are involved. ELINT satellites, on the other hand, are probably the most capable in this area, with sensors that in theory could be deployed on a variety of dedicated or shared platforms that range in size and orbital placement. US
- Over-The-Horizon (OTH-R): Over-the-horizon (OTH) radar systems were first developed during the Cold War as part of the early warning defense network. With the end of the Cold War, research into OTH radar continued, with a new focus: detection of illegal aircraft engaged in drug smuggling. Current research had its genesis in U.S. Air Force and Navy laboratories in the 1960s, as well as at
. At present, the Stanford University United States, Russia, China, and employ OTH radar for surveillance purposes. Much of the current effort is concentrated on the development of relocatable OTH radar (ROTHR), first demonstrated by the Navy in the early 1980s. OTH-R provides detection of ships and aircraft at ranges in excess of a couple thousand miles. This extended range is achieved when transmitted HF energy is refracted by the ionosphere onto distant targets. The faint energy reflected back from these targets (backscatter) is detected by a separate radar receive antenna after returning along the refraction path. The surface of the earth and the targets in the area of interest reflect some of this energy back through the ionosphere to a separate receive site, where it is processed to generate target track information. OTH-R operates in the High Frequency (HF) band (3 to 30 MHz) which is also typically not affected by stealth shapes or materials. OTH-R, in any of its several types in use, requires very large antenna arrays which are fixed in location and have a processing center located nearby. Using ROTHR as an example of OTH-R configuration and operations, we see that the ROTHR achieves a nominal half degree azimuth angular resolution with a 2.58-km-long linear phased receiving array consisting of 372 twin-monopole elements. Each monopole pair has a receiver and analog-to-digital converter attached to it. A digital beamformer forms 18 beams which are then Doppler processed to separate the moving targets from the ground clutter. Range resolution is achieved by transmitting a 25-kHz continuous frequency-modulated waveform. A radar resolution cell on the ocean surface is therefore about 6 km in range by about 15 km in azimuth, for the frequency and range used. Radar frequency is variable and is selected using real-time sweep frequency ionospheric soundings. The propagation path is by ionospheric refraction which provides a "mirror" but with considerable variability. This variability is not predictable on a short-term basis; in addition, target illumination is generally by multiple paths. Tracking information thus has varying degrees of accuracy due to the changes and uncertainties of the ionosphere caused by factors such as the time of day, season, sun spot number, and other solar activity. HF radar must measure and adapt to the environment in real time, and oblique backscatter soundings routinely taken. Australia
CRS Report RL30427, Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries, by Andrew Feickert
CRS Report RL33153,
Dong Feng/Julan Series Missiles: http://www.softwar.net/dongfeng.html
Donnelly, John M. “China On Course To Be Pentagon’s Next Worry,” CQ Weekly,
Federation of American Scientists: http://www.fas.org/main/home.jsp
Global Security: http://www.globalsecurity.org/
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